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RULES OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY
JEFFREY M. SHAMAN
INTRODUCTION
As their name suggests, rules of general applicability have a
broad scope considerably more comprehensive than laws specifically
directed at a particular activity. In the context of constitutional
adjudication, the concept of general applicability is commonly used to
distinguish general laws being applied to regulate speech or religious
activities from laws aimed specifically at those very activities. For
example, a law requiring individuals to obtain a permit before
conducting large-scale events in a public park is a general law that does
not target speech,' whereas a law requiring individuals to obtain a permit
before conducting a march or demonstration in a public park specifically
targets speech.2 A law prohibiting animal cruelty is a general law that is
not aimed at a religious practice, whereas a law prohibiting ritual animal
sacrifice is specifically aimed at a religious practice.4
Laws of general applicability usually are characterized by
neutrality toward speech or religion. As explained by the Supreme Court,
the concepts of neutrality and general applicability are interrelated, and
"failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the other has
*Vincent de Paul Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. The
author is grateful to his colleague David Franklin for his perceptive comments and
suggestions concerning this article. Thanks also are due to Andrew Daar for his
diligent research work for the article.
1. See Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316 (2002).
2. See generally Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, Ala., 394 U.S. 147, 159
(1969).
3. See generally United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 238-41 (2008).
4. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520 (1993).
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not been satisfied."5 While the concepts are not identical, 6 a law that fails
the requirement of neutrality invariably will fail the requirement of
general applicability. Thus, neutrality toward speech or religion is a
necessary component of a law of general applicability.
The principle of general applicability parallels equal protection
jurisprudence; to require laws to be generally applicable corresponds to
the requirement of equal treatment under the law.
Along the same lines, in determining if a law is neutral, guidance
can be found in equal protection discourse.9 In fact, the Supreme Court
has said that "[n]eutrality in its application requires an equal protection
mode of analysis."' 0
Laws specifically directed to regulating speech or religion are
subject to a heightened degree of judicial scrutiny under the First
Amendment, which of course prohibits the government from making any
law that abridges the free exercise of religion or freedom of speech.1
Under this form of heightened scrutiny, laws aimed at expressive or
religious activity will be struck down as unconstitutional unless the
government can demonstrate that they are carefully tailored to serve a
strong state interest.1 In contradistinction, laws of general applicability,
even when used to regulate speech or religious activities, may evade
5. Id. at 531.
6. See Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise:
Smith, Lukumi and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
850, 865 (2001).
7. See id. at 886 ("Since a law that is not neutral will never be generally
applicable, a law that fails the neutrality test must also fail the test of general
applicability."). However, the converse is not true; a law that is not generally
applicable may be neutral in regard to speech or religion. See id at 865.
8. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540-46.
9. Id. at 540.
10. Id. (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
11. U.S. CONsT. amend. I (providing that Congress shall make no law
abridging the free exercise of religion or freedom of speech). The Supreme Court has
ruled that all of the provisions in the First Amendment are incorporated through the
Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the states. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 148 (1968).
12. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 1297-98 (4th ed. 2011).
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review under the First Amendment altogether. In some instances, the
Court has held that, despite their restrictive effect upon speech or
religion, rules of general applicability do not implicate the First
Amendment. 4 For some cases, therefore, it is extremely important to
determine whether the law in question is a rule of general applicability,
neutral in regard to speech or religion.
Of course, the degree of a law's generality is a relative matter
and one that can vary considerably depending upon the point of view
from which it is assessed. Determining whether a law is general or
specific is a complicated matter that may depend upon the perspective
from which a law is considered." Along one dimension, a law may
appear relatively general, while along another dimension it may appear
less so.' 6 To illustrate this phenomenon, Laurence Tribe and Michael
Dorf posit a comparative analysis of a rule recognizing a right to
procreate and a rule recognizing a right of intimate association.1 At first
glance, the former might seem more specifically delineated than the
latter and certainly not broad enough to include a right to engage in
sexual relations with a partner of the same sex. On the other hand, a rule
recognizing a right to intimate association would not encompass a right
to undergo anonymous artificial insemination or to supply an ovum for
laboratory fertilization and subsequent incubation by a surrogate
mother.' 8 Viewed along the latter dimension, it is the rule recognizing a
right to intimate association that appears more specifically delineated. In
truth, neither rule can be said to be more or less general than the other;
the comparative extent of each rule's generality varies according to the
perspective from which it is appraised.
13. See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (finding that the Free
Exercise Clause permits a State to prohibit sacramental peyote use); Arcara v. Cloud
Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986) (holding that a state's closure statute did not
violate the First Amendment rights of a bookseller who operated a business on a
premises used for prostitution); see also Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on
Fundamental Rights, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1175, 1211-19 (1996).
14. See supra note 13.
15. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE
CONSTITUTION 76, 101-04 (1991).
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Moreover, the generality of a law is a matter of degree. All laws
are selective to some extent,19 but some more so than others. As a result,
the determination of whether a law is general or specific can be rather
subjective. At one extreme are broadly-worded laws, comprehensive in
scope and neutral in regard to speech or religion; at the other extreme are
specialized laws that categorically single out speech or religious
activities for disfavored treatment.20 Richard Duncan maintains that
between these extremes there is an "infinity of hard cases" involving
laws not readily characterized as either general or specific.2
It should be mentioned that, although freedom of the press is
expressly guaranteed by the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has
consistently taken the position that the press is not immune from the
22application of general regulatory laws. For example, the Court has
ruled that the press must obey copyright laws,23 the National Labor
24 25 2Relations Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and antitrust laws.26
Still, constitutional law scholar Erwin Chemerinsky asserts that in none
of those cases was there proof that application of the law in question
19. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
542 (1993).
20. See Duncan, supra note 6, at 859 (noting the "infinity of hard cases" that
fall between the extremes of a generally applicable law and a "specifically directed"
law); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207-08 (1972) (discussing a
comprehensive Wisconsin law which was designed to be neutral with regard to
religion, mandating compulsory school attendance for children ages seven to sixteen
years old); Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 521 (describing city ordinances which were designed
to target the local Santeria community by eliminating the opportunity to legally
sacrifice animals as a part of their religious ritual).
21. See Duncan, supra note 6, at 859. Professor Duncan posits three laws to
illustrate his point. The first is a law that totally prohibits the use of alcohol
beverages; this is an easy case, clearly a law of general applicability. The second is a
law that prohibits only the sacramental use of alcoholic beverages; this, too, is an
easy case, clearly a law that specifically targets religion. The third law prohibits the
use of alcoholic beverages but allows an exception permitting alcoholic beverages to
be served with meals at restaurants; should this law be considered a neutral law of
general applicability or does the exception render the law discriminatory toward
religion? Id. at 859-60.
22. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991).
23. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
24. Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
25. Okla. Press Publ'g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
26. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
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"would undermine First Amendment values." 2 7 "If the press could prove
in a particular case that the application of a general [regulatory] law
significantly burdened" freedom of the press, it might be necessary for
the Court to consider "whether an exemption from the general law [was]
appropriate." 28
Aside from the arena of freedom of the press, the Supreme
Court's treatment of rules of general applicability has been anything but
consistent. In cases involving equal protection of the law, freedom of
speech, and the free exercise of religion, the Court's treatment of rules of
general applicability has wavered from one extreme to the other, leaving
a perplexing body of constitutional doctrine.
EQUALITY
The principle of general applicability is similar to the principle
of equality that underlies the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
29
Amendment. Laws that selectively impose a burden on expressive or
religious activities are a form of discrimination antithetical to the
principle of equality.30 Neutral laws of general applicability appear to be
nondiscriminatory, although in some instances they may have a
31
discriminatory impact.
The notion that rules of general applicability are
nondiscriminatory traces back to a dissenting opinion written by Justice
Harlan in Douglas v. California.32 In that case, the Supreme Court held
that in a criminal case where a state grants a first appeal as a matter of
right, it must provide free counsel for indigent defendants. A state's
27. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
1169 (3d ed. 2006).
28. Id.
29. See Christopher C. Lund, A Matter of Constitutional Luck: The General
Applicability Requirement in Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 627, 637-39 (2003).
30. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 542-43 (1993).
31. See JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: ILLUSION
AND REALITY 161-64 (2001).
32. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
33. Id. at 353.
423
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failure to do so, the Court ruled, amounts to invidious discrimination
between the rich and the poor that violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.34 The Court explained that equality was
lacking because the rich enjoy the benefit of counsel, while the poor do
not.35 Justice Harlan dissented, arguing that the Equal Protection Clause
was not apposite to the case because, as he saw it, the state's failure to
provide counsel for indigent persons was not a discriminatory act.36
While agreeing that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination
"between the 'rich' and the 'poor' as such in the formulation and
application of . . . laws," Justice Harlan contended that "it is a far
different thing to suggest that [the Equal Protection Clause] prevents the
State from adopting a law of general applicability that may affect the
poor more harshly than it does the rich."3 7 By Justice Harlan's account,
the state has no affirmative duty to "lift the handicaps flowing from
differences in economic circumstances," and therefore laws of general
applicability such as the one in Douglas "do not deny equal protection to
the less fortunate." 38
Justice Harlan's reasoning in Douglas reduces the Equal
Protection Clause to a shield against facial discrimination but little else.
As he sees it, so long as a law is generally applicable, whatever
discriminatory impact it may have is irrelevant.39 His suggestion that the
Equal Protection Clause does not prevent a state from enacting a law of
general applicability "that may affect the poor more harshly than it does
the rich" 40 sounds eerily reminiscent of Anatole France's pronouncement
that the law, in its "majestic quality . . . prohibits the wealthy as well as
the poor from sleeping under bridges, from begging in the streets, and
from stealing bread." 41 Of course, Anatole France was being ironic;
Justice Harlan was not.
Despite its dismissive attitude, or perhaps because of it, Justice
Harlan's line of thought in Douglas was embraced in another dissenting
34. Id. at 355-58.
35. Id. at 357-58.
36. Id. at 361-62 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 362.
39. See id.
40. Id. at 361.
41. ANATOLE FRANCE, LE Lys ROUGE (THE RED LILLY) 87 (1905).
[Vol. 10424
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opinion some years later, this one written by Justice Thomas in ML.B. v.
S.L.J.42 This case concerned the dismissal of a mother's appeal from a
Chancery Court order permanently terminating her parental rights. 43 Her
appeal was dismissed because she could not afford to pay the fee for
preparation of a trial record, which was required in advance for an
appeal.44 In approaching the issue presented by the case, the Court
stressed the gravity of the situation, pointing out that a state's authority
to permanently sever a parent-child bond "demands the close
consideration the Court has long required when a family association so
undeniably important is at stake."4 5 Noting that the case involved both
equal protection and due process concerns, the Court concluded that it
violated the Fourteenth Amendment to deny the mother's right to appeal
the termination of her parental rights solely because she could not afford
46
to pay the fee for preparation of the record. Justice Thomas, however,
felt otherwise. In a dissenting opinion relying heavily on the Harlan
dissent in Douglas as well as a similar Harlan dissent in Griffin v.
Illinois,47 Justice Thomas argued that there was no equal protection
violation when the right to appeal is denied by a "facially neutral law"
48
requiring a person to pay a fee for the preparation of a trial record. In
42. 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
43. Id. at 109.
44. Id. The fee was $2,352.36. Id.
45. Id. at 116-17. Quoting several cases, the Court also said that:
A termination of parental rights is both total and irrevocable.
Unlike other custody proceedings, it leaves the parent with no
right to visit or communicate with the child . . . .
Santosky held that a "clear and convincing" proof standard is
constitutionally required in. parental termination proceedings.
In so ruling, the Court again emphasized that a termination
decree is "final and irrevocable." "Few forms of state action,"
the Court said, "are both so severe and so irreversible." As in
Lassiter, the Court characterized the parent's interest as
"commanding," indeed, "far more precious than any property
right."
Id. at 118-19 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
46. Id. at 107, 120.
47. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
48. ML.B., 519 U.S. at 135-39 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
425
his view, the Equal Protection Clause "seeks to 'guarantee equal laws,
not equal results."' 49
For supporting authority, Justice Thomas turned to Washington
v. Davis,50 in which the Supreme Court upheld a government
employment test that was challenged as racially discriminatory because a
considerably greater proportion of black applicants failed the test than
did white applicants." In upholding the test, the Court ruled that proof of
discriminatory intent or purpose was required to trigger strict scrutiny
52
under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court also ruled that while the
disproportionate impact of a law was not irrelevant, standing alone it was
not sufficient to establish purposeful discrimination. 3 Using a deferential
form of minimal scrutiny, the Court went on to approve the test, despite
the fact that the test had never been validated as a reliable measure of job
performance. 54 For Justice Thomas, then, the lesson of Davis was that the
Equal Protection Clause prohibits only purposeful discrimination and
that a disparate impact, even upon members of a racial minority, does not
. . 55violate equal protection.
By this account, unless a malevolent intent can be shown to
underlie a law, facial neutrality will be considered dispositive. If a law is
neutral on its face or generally applicable, that it may affect one group of
persons more harshly than another is of no consequence. According to
this view, facially neutral laws of general applicability are not considered
discriminatory despite any disparate impact they may have; the
requirements of equal protection are satisfied so long as a law is neutral
on its face and has a general application.
49. Id. at 135 (quoting Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273
(1979)). Justice Thomas advanced a similar position in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.
343, 373-78 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring).
50. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
51. Id. at 232.
52. Id. at 239-40.
53. Id. at 241-42.
54. Id. at 229.
55. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 135 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Along
similar lines, Justice Scalia has stated that absent proof of discriminatory intent, a
generally applicable law that has a disparate impact is not unconstitutional. In his
view, "The Fourteenth Amendment does not regard neutral laws as invidious ones,
even when their burdens purportedly fall disproportionately on a protected class."
Crawford v. Marion Cnty., 553 U.S. 181, 207 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring).
[Vol. 10426 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
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Davis, however, involved a situation significantly different than
the one in ML.B. As noted in the majority opinion in ML.B., written by
Justice Ginsburg, in Davis, although there certainly was a disparate
impact along racial lines, the disparity was not absolute; successful test
takers included members of both races, as did the group of unsuccessful
56
test takers. In contrast, the governmental action at issue in ML.B.
resulted not merely in a disproportionate impact, but one that was
"wholly contingent on one's ability to pay and thus 'visit[ed] different
consequences on two categories of persons.'" 57 In other words, the
disparate impact in ML.B. was absolute, applying to all indigent persons
and to no one outside that class. Thus, the discriminatory effect in Davis
was less acute than in ML.B., and therefore less indicative of a need for
heightened judicial scrutiny.
Even so, the decision in Davis is questionable. Charles
Lawrence maintains that by requiring proof of discriminatory intent or
purpose, Davis "places a very heavy, and often impossible, burden of
persuasion on the wrong side of the dispute." 9 Discriminatory purpose
may be covert or unconscious, and improper motives often are easy to
hide.60 Because laws usually are enacted through the interaction of
multiple motives, "governmental officials will always be able to argue
that . . . neutral considerations prompted their actions."6' Moreover,
discriminatory treatment, whether intentional or not, is harmful.6 In
Davis itself, persons were denied employment in a discriminatory
manner on the basis of a test that had never been validated to establish its
56. ML.B., 519 U.S. at 126.
57. Id. at 126-27 (quoting Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 242 (1970)).
58. See Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 1105, 1120 (1989); David Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of
Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 935, 940-45 (1989).
59. Charles Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 319 (1987).
60. Id. at 322-23, 354-55.
61. Id. at 319. See also, Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 265 (1977) ("Rarely can it be said that a legislature or administrative body
operating under a broad mandate made a decision motivated solely by a single
concern, or even that a particular purpose was the 'dominant' or 'primary' one.").
62. See Kenneth Karst, The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 1163, 1165 (1978).
427
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reliability for measuring job performance.63 By discounting the
significance of the disproportionate impact of the test, the Court in Davis
condoned governmental action that resulted in the denial of equal
treatment. Unwilling to deal with the complexities of discrimination,
the Court simply denied its existence.
In Davis, the Court did allow that the disparate impact of a law,
if so extreme as to be systematic, may be sufficient in itself to establish
unconstitutional discrimination.65 So, for example, in a case like
Gomillion v. Lightfoot,66 where government officials redrew the
boundaries of a city, transforming it from a square shape to a "strangely
irregular" 28-sided figure and thereby placing all but a few black
persons, but not a single white person, outside the city limits, there could
be no doubt that the redistricting plan amounted to purposeful racial
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.67
The Court further recognized in Davis that an invidious
discriminatory purpose may be inferred from the totality of relevant
facts, including the fact that a law has a disproportionate impact.
Accordingly, in Hunter v. Underwood 9 the Court found that the Equal
Protection Clause was violated by a state law permanently denying the
right to vote to anyone convicted of a "crime involving moral
turpitude. ,70 Although the law was racially neutral on its face, evidence
conclusively demonstrated that the law was enacted with racial animus,
which, in conjunction with the law's racially disparate impact,
established the presence of invidious racial discrimination.7 1
Whatever else might be said about Davis, it is clear that it did not
overrule Douglas. While Justice Thomas argued in his dissenting opinion
in ML.B. that Davis adopted Justice Harlan's (dissenting) view in
72
Douglas, a majority of the Court thought otherwise, explicitly stating
63. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 233, 235 (1976).
64. Id. at 245-46.
65. See id. at 241.
66. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
67. Id. at 340-41.
68. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
69. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
70. See id. at 223.
71. Id. at 229-32.
72. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 135 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
428 [Vol. 10
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that Davis "does not have the sweeping effect" attributed to it.7 3 And,
while Justice Thomas frankly admitted in ML.B. that he was inclined to
overrule Douglas and its progeny,74 a majority of the Court reaffirmed
their continuing vitality."
Notwithstanding the exhortations of Justice Thomas or Justice
Harlan, few other justices have been so willing to overlook the
discriminatory impact of facially neutral laws. In fact, the Court has
acknowledged on several occasions that "a law nondiscriminatory on its
face may be grossly discriminatory in its operation." 76 Nor have
apologetics for facially neutral laws deterred the Court from finding a
number of such laws to violate the Equal Protection Clause. Neither the
Harlan dissent in Douglas nor the Thomas dissent in ML.B. was able to
dissuade a majority of the Court from finding violations of the Equal
Protection Clause.77 In other cases, too, the Court has seen fit to strike
down facially neutral laws of general applicability due to their disparate
impact.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
In the course of interpreting the First Amendment, the Supreme
Court has developed a network of rules to protect freedom of speech.
Within this structure, regulations of speech are subject to searching
judicial scrutiny, which allows speech to be restricted only when it is the
79 80cause of serious harm.79 The harm must be real and demonstrably so.
The expression of an idea may not be prohibited merely because it is
disagreeable or offensive. A regulation of speech must be narrowly
73. Id. at 126 (majority opinion).
74. Id. at 139 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 110-12, 126-27 (majority opinion).
76. Id. at 127 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,17 n.11 (1956)).
77. See supra notes 32-38, 42-49.
78. See Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605 (2005); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S.
1 (1981); Mayer v. City of Chi., 404 U.S. 189 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S.
235 (1970); Griffin, 351 U.S. at 12.
79. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
80. Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
81. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit
429
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tailored to accomplish its purpose, and an overbroad regulation of speech
may be declared unconstitutional on its face.8 Content-based regulations
of speech are subject to strict judicial scrutiny and will be struck down as
unconstitutional unless shown to be necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest. Content-neutral regulations of speech84 are subject to an
intermediate level of scrutiny and will be struck down as unconstitutional
unless shown to be carefully tailored to achieve an important state
interest.
In Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., however, the Supreme Court
abandoned these principles. Arcara involved a New York statute
authorizing the closure of an adult bookstore on the ground that it was a
public health nuisance because it was being used as a place for
87
prostitution and lewdness. Before the case reached the Supreme Court,
the New York Court of Appeals had ruled that the closure order violated
the First Amendment by interfering with the right of the owners of the
bookstore to sell books on the premises of the store.8 The New York
court followed the four-part test set forth by the Supreme Court in United
States v. O'Brien89 that governs cases involving regulations of expressive
conduct. 90 As the New York court viewed the situation, the closure order
failed the fourth part of the O'Brien test, which requires that a statute
the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.").
82. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); United States v. Stevens, 559
U.S. _, _, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587-88 (2010).
83. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
84. As used in this sense, a content-neutral regulation of speech is one that is
aimed at speech in general but is neutral in regard to the message conveyed by
speech, in other words, that does not discriminate on the basis of the content of
speech. A neutral law of general applicability, on the other hand, is one that is aimed
more broadly at conduct and is neutral in regard to speech generally. For example, a
law that prohibits handbills is content-neutral (because it prohibits all handbills
regardless of their content), but is not a neutral law of general applicability (because
it is aimed at a form of speech, handbills).
85. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994).
86. 478 U.S. 697 (1986).
87. See generally id.
88. People ex. rel Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 480 N.E.2d 1089, 1099 (N.Y.
1985), rev'dsub nom Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc. 478 U.S. 697 (1986).
89. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
90. Arcara, 480 N.E.2d at 1098.
430 [Vol. 10
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incidentally restricting expressive activity be no broader than necessary
to achieve its purpose. The New York court reasoned that the order was
much broader than necessary to achieve its purpose of curbing illicit
sexual activity and that an injunction against continuing the illegal
activity on the premises could achieve the same effect without restricting
respondents' bookselling activity.92
On appeal, however, the Supreme Court saw things quite
differently and, reversing the New York court, ruled that the closure
order did not violate the First Amendment. 93 In an opinion written by
Chief Justice Burger, the Court took the position that the O'Brien test
had no relevance to the case because the imposition of the closure order
was not directed to expressive conduct.94 From the high court's
perspective, the First Amendment was not implicated by the enforcement
of "a public health regulation of general application against the physical
premises in which respondents happen to sell books."95 Dismissing any
constitutional concerns, the Court declared, "neither the press nor
booksellers may claim special protection from government regulations of
general applicability simply by virtue of their First Amendment protected
activities."96
Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the majority insisted that the
First Amendment was not implicated by a rule of general applicability
merely because it had a restrictive effect upon expressive conduct.9 7 He
rebuffed the claim for First Amendment protection as asking for too
much, "since every civil and criminal remedy imposes some conceivable
burden on First Amendment protected activities." 9 8 In a concurring
opinion, Justice O'Connor made a similar point, arguing that any other
conclusion would lead to the "absurd result" that any governmental
action having some conceivable inhibitory effect upon speech, such as
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1099.
93. Arcara, 478 U.S. at 707.
94. Id. at 705 n.2, 707.
95. Id. at 707.
96. Id. at 705.
97. Id. at 706-07.
98. Id. 705-06.
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the arrest of a newscaster for a traffic violation, would require analysis
under the First Amendment.99
The approach taken by Chief Justice Burger in Arcara
diminishes the scope of protection afforded by the First Amendment for
freedom of expression. In his view, rules of general applicability that
"happen" to restrict expressive activities are not subject to First
Amendment requirements.'00 So long as a law is directed generally to
conduct, the fact that it imposes "an incidental burden" on free speech is
irrelevant.o'0 By this account, even when they have a restrictive effect
upon freedom of expression, rules of general applicability are exempt
from review under the First Amendment.
Chief Justice Burger was willing to acknowledge that under
some circumstances rules of general applicability were not exempt from
First Amendment review. 10 Scrutiny under the First Amendment may be
evoked where a general law imposes a disproportionate burden upon
parties engaged in expressive activity. 03 This occurred in Minneapolis
Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue'04 where the
Court ruled that a use tax assessed on the cost of paper and ink products
violated the First Amendment by imposing a significant burden on
freedom of the press. os In addition, scrutiny under the First Amendment
may be triggered where a general law restricts conduct that has a
significant expressive element.o This occurred in O'Brien, where an
individual was convicted of burning his draft card in violation of a
federal statute that made it a crime to destroy, mutilate, or otherwise alter
a draft registration card.107 Although it upheld the conviction, the Court
99. Id. at 708 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 707 (majority opinion) ("[W]e conclude the First Amendment is not
implicated by the enforcement of a public health regulation of general application
against the physical premises in which respondents happen to sell books.").
101. Id. at 705.
102. Id. at 702-05.
103. Id. at 704-07.
104. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
105. Id. at 592-93.
106. Arcara, 478 U.S. at 704-07.
107. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 370 (1968). See also, Clark v.
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (using heightened First
Amendment scrutiny to review a federal regulation prohibiting camping in certain
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applied First Amendment scrutiny because the law in question restricted
conduct (burning a draft card to protest the Viet Nam war) that had a
substantial expressive element. os
In Arcara, however, Chief Justice Burger insisted that the
situation involved neither the Minneapolis Star nor O'Brien paradigm,
and therefore First Amendment concerns were not implicated.' 09 He
professed that "unlike the symbolic draft card burning in O'Brien, the
sexual activity carried on in [Arcara] manifests absolutely no element of
protected expression."110 This misguided attempt to distinguish Arcara
from O'Brien disregards the fact that the closure order in Arcara was
directed not merely to the sexual activity occurring in the bookstore, but
to the entire operation of the bookstore. By dictating closure of the
bookstore (for a year, no less), the order restricted conduct-the selling
and buying of books-that undeniably had a strong expressive
element." 2 In narrowing his focus to the particular conduct that
prompted the closure order and thereby ignoring the extent of the
conduct actually encompassed within the scope of the order, Chief
Justice Burger was able to pretend that there was no restriction of
expressive activities protected by the First Amendment.
Justice Blackmun entered a dissenting opinion in Arcara,
asserting that the First Amendment provided protection against all laws
that abridge freedom of speech, not just those specifically directed at
expressive activity." 3 He maintained that the Court had never previously
suggested that a state may suppress speech without justification so long
as it does so through a generally applicable regulation not directed to
expressive conduct.114 Justice Blackmun admitted that at some point the
impact of state regulation on freedom of speech may become so
attenuated that it is easily outweighed by a countervailing state
parks as applied to restrict a group of demonstrators from sleeping in Lafayette Park
and the Mall to call attention to the plight of the homeless).
108. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-82.
109. Arcara, 478 U.S. at 707.
110. Id at 705.
111. Id at 699.
112. Id.
113. Id at 709 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
114. Id
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interest.s15 But when a state directly and substantially impairs First
Amendment activities, such as by shutting down a bookstore, he thought
that the state must show, at a minimum, that it has chosen the least
restrictive means of pursuing its legitimate objectives.116
Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Arcara was not persuasive to
the New York Court of Appeals, which, when the case was remanded to
it, reinstated its former ruling that the closure order was improper, this
time, however, basing its ruling on the guarantee of freedom of speech
set forth in the New York Constitution rather than the Federal
Constitution." 7 While the New York court recognized that it was bound
to follow the decision in Arcara in determining the scope and effect of
the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution, the court made it clear
that it possessed independent authority to interpret the state constitutional
guarantee of free speech more expansively than the federal guarantee. 1
Noting New York's long history and tradition of fostering freedom of
expression, the court reasoned that the "minimal national standard"
established by the Supreme Court for First Amendment rights could not
be taken as dispositive in determining the scope of the state
constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression.11 9 Under the New
York Constitution, there was no doubt that bookselling was a
constitutionally protected activity or that closing a bookstore may have a
substantial impact on that activity.120 While a bookstore of course cannot
claim an exemption from statutes of general operation aimed at
preventing nuisances or hazards to the public health and safety,
bookstores are entitled to "special protection" under the state guarantee
of freedom of expression. 121 Because the closure order was broader than
necessary to achieve its purpose of curbing illicit sexual activity, the
Court concluded that the order violated the New York constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech.122
115. Id. at 710.
116. Id.
117. People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc. 503 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y. 1986).
118. Id. at 494-95.
119. Id.
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The New York court also took the occasion to respond to Justice
O'Connor's assertion in Arcara that to accept the bookseller's claim of
First Amendment protection would lead to the "absurd result" that any
governmental action having some conceivable inhibitory effect upon
speech would require analysis under the First Amendment.123 Not so, the
New York court explained, because not every government regulation of
general application that has some impact on free speech implicates
constitutional guarantees.124 "Arresting a newspaper reporter for a traffic
violation," the example noted by Justice O'Connor, does not rise to the
level of a "constitutionally cognizable" claim.125 "But closing a
bookstore for a year, as is required by this statute, cannot be said to have
such a slight and indirect impact on free expression as to have no
significance constitutionally."l 2 6
Chief Justice Burger's approach in Arcara has not found much
favor in subsequent Supreme Court cases involving freedom of
expression. The Court rarely, if ever, mentions it as a reason for rejecting
First Amendment free speech claims. In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. ,127
despite the exhortations of Justice Scalia,128 the Court declined to adopt
the Arcara approach.129 Barnes involved the prohibition of nude dancing
under a public indecency statute proscribing nudity. 130 By a vote of 5-4,
with no majority opinion in the case, the Court found that the prohibition
of nude dancing did not violate the First Amendment. Although fully
eight of the justices agreed that nude dancing was expressive conduct
entitled to some degree of protection under the First Amendment, they
differed sharply as to whether the prohibition of nude dancing could be
squared with relevant First Amendment principles. 132Of all the justices,
123. Id. See Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 708 (1986)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
124. Arcara, 503 N.E.2d at 495.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
128. See id. at 579-81 (Scalia, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 570-71 (plurality opinion).
130. Id. at 562-63.
131. Id. at 572.
132. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a plurality opinion joined by Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy, which grudgingly admitted that the nude dancing involved
in the case was expressive conduct entitled to some degree of protection under the
435
only Justice Scalia thought that the First Amendment had no application
to the case. 133 The challenged regulation must be upheld, he proclaimed,
"because, as a general law regulating conduct and not specifically
directed at expression, it is not subject to First Amendment scrutiny at
all."'134 Echoing the Burger and O'Connor opinions in Arcara, Justice
Scalia argued in Barnes that virtually every law restricts conduct and
virtually any prohibited conduct can be performed for an expressive
purpose. In Scalia's view, therefore, it was not reasonable to
implement First Amendment review for every restriction of expression
incidentally produced by a general law regulating conduct.136 This
argument, however, was not enough to sway any other justice, perhaps
because it cuts such a deep swath in the scope of the First Amendment
and allows freedom of speech to be suppressed without requiring any
justification for the suppression. To exempt general rules that have a
restrictive effect upon speech activities from any First Amendment
scrutiny at all, as Justice Scalia would do, would grant the government
carte blanche to restrict freedom of speech through general rules without
showing a proper reason for doing so.
Moreover, the contention that virtually any conduct can be
performed for an expressive purpose and therefore may be used to seek
First Amendment. Id. at 565-66. Purporting to apply the O'Brien four-part test that
obtains in cases concerning expressive conduct, Chief Justice Rehnquist upheld the
prohibition of nude dancing on the ground that it served the state interest in
protecting social order and morality. Id. at 571-72. Justice Souter entered a
concurring opinion noting that nude dancing was inherently expressive. Id at 581
(Souter, J., concurring). Applying the O'Brien test, Justice Souter found the
prohibition of nude dancing was justifiable as a means of preventing the secondary
effects of prostitution, sexual assault, and other criminal activity. Id. at 587. Justice
White authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens, asserting that nude dancing was inherently expressive and that the
prohibition of it failed under the O'Brien test. Id. at 595-96 (White, J., dissenting). It
further should be noted that in a subsequent case Justice Souter continued to
maintain that nude dancing was inherently expressive, but repudiated that part of his
Barnes opinion arguing that nude dancing could be prohibited in order to prevent the
secondary effects of prostitution, sexual assault, and other criminal activity. See City
of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 310 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
133. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 572 (Scalia, J., concurring).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 576.
136. Id
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First Amendment shelter seems hyperbolic. As Justice Blackmun
explained in his dissenting opinion in Arcara, at some point the impact
of state regulation on freedom of speech will become so attenuated that it
is easily outweighed by a countervailing state interest,137 if not dismissed
altogether as not presenting a claim under the First Amendment. Not
every government regulation that has some impact on speech, no matter
138
how slight or indirect, implicates First Amendment concerns.
Occasionally, the Court may refer to the concept of general
applicability, when a challenged law is not one of general applicability,
so as to provide all the more justification for the use of heightened
scrutiny or particular rules designed to protect freedom of speech. For
instance, in Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co.,139 the Court
allowed a facial challenge to a law restricting the placement of
newspaper vending racks on public property.140 The Court explained that
a facial challenge was appropriate because the law in question operated
as a licensing system that gave government officials substantial
discretion, which could be utilized to discriminate on the basis of the
content or viewpoint of speech.141 In addition, the Court noted a second
feature of the licensing system that further supported a facial challenge:
the licensing system was "directed narrowly and specifically at
expression or conduct commonly associated with expression."' 42 Thus, it
was unlike "laws of general application that are not aimed at conduct
commonly associated with expression and . . . carry with them little
danger of censorship." 43
The Court's statement in Lakewood might be dismissed as mere
obiter dictum; nonetheless it suggests a lingering belief that laws of
general applicability pose less threat to First Amendment concerns than
laws specifically aimed at expressive activities. That is not to say,
137. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 710 (1986) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
138. People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 492, 495 (N.Y.
1986).
139. 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
140. Id. at 753.
141. Id. at 759.
142. Id. at 760.
143. Id. at 760-61.
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however, that when used to restrict expressive activities, laws of general
applicability are exempt from review under the First Amendment.
144
In a recent case, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the
Court rejected the notion that First Amendment requirements are
downgraded where speech is being regulated through a law of general
applicability.145 Holder involved a constitutional challenge to a federal
statute that made it a crime to knowingly provide "'material support or
resources'". to any entity designated by the Secretary of State as a foreign
terrorist organization.146 The statute defined material support to include
property, money or other financing, equipment, facilities, weapons,
training, and expert advice or assistance.14 7 The plaintiffs, who wanted to
advise certain terrorist organizations how to achieve their goals through
legal channels such as using international law to resolve disputes
peacefully or to petition the United Nations for relief, challenged the
1
constitutionality of the statute as applied to their activities. In
defending the statute, the government argued that rather than using the
form of strict scrutiny that ordinarily would be employed to review
statutes such as this one that are content-based, the Court should reduce
the degree of scrutiny to an intermediate level because the statute
"generally functions as a regulation of conduct."l 49 In refusing to
downgrade the level of scrutiny, the Court pointed out that the
government's argument was contrary to a number of precedents, most
prominently Cohen v. California.50 The Court explained that Cohen also
involved a generally applicable law regulating conduct (a breach of the
peace statute) but when Mr. Cohen was convicted under the statute for
wearing a jacket bearing a profane epithet ("Fuck the Draft"), the Court
did not see fit to apply a reduced level of scrutiny.' To the contrary, the
Court recognized that the breach of the peace statute, though a generally
144. 561 U.S. , 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
145. See generally id.
146. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2712 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2009)).
147. Id. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 2712-13 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1)
(2009)).
148. Id. at ,130 S. Ct. at 2712.
149. Id. at ,130 S. Ct. at 2724.
150. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 2724 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971)).
151. Id. at ,130 S. Ct. at 2724.
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applicable law, had been directed at Cohen because of the message
conveyed by his speech.152 That is, he had been found to violate the
breach of the peace statute due to the offensive content of his particular
message. The Court therefore applied strict scrutiny and reversed
Cohen's conviction.153
In the Court's view, the situation in Holder fit the same category
as Cohen. The law in question was directed generally at conduct, but was
being applied to regulate expressive conduct-speech. 5 4 As a result,
strict rather than intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate standard of
review.155 Using strict scrutiny, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
the statute as applied to the plaintiffs' activities on the ground that there
was a compelling state interest in protecting national security from the
threats posed by foreign terrorist organizations.156 In Holder, though, the
Court squarely ruled that the full force of the First Amendment pertains
to rules of general applicability when they are employed to regulate
expressive activities.
FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
In 1963, the Supreme Court decided Sherbert v. Verner,15 7 ruling
that laws that burden the free exercise of religion were subject to strict
judicial scrutiny and had to be justified by a showing of a compelling
state interest. 58 Under that approach, the Court ruled that the government
violated the Free Exercise Clause by denying unemployment benefits to
a member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church who quit her job rather
than work on Saturday, which she observed as the Sabbath. 5 9 Noting
that the appellant had been forced to choose between following the
precepts of her religion and forfeiting unemployment benefits, the Court
concluded that the state's imposition of such a choice upon the appellant
was a significant burden on the free exercise of religion that was not
152. Id. at ,130 S. Ct. at 2724.
153. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 2724.
154. Id. at ,130 S. Ct. at 2724.
155. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 2724.
156. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 2731.
157. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
158. Id. at 406-09.
159. Id. at 409-4 10.
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supported by a compelling state interest.160 Adhering to the ruling in
Sherbert, the Court applied strict scrutiny in several other cases in
holding that the Free Exercise Clause was violated where persons were
denied unemployment benefits for quitting their jobs for sincerely-held
. . 161religious reasons.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,162 the Court extended the ruling in
Sherbert in holding that the Free Exercise Clause was violated by
requiring Amish children to comply with a compulsory school
attendance law contrary to their religious beliefs. 16 The Court stated in
Yoder that the case could not be disposed of on the ground that the
compulsory attendance law applied uniformly to all children and did not
facially "discriminate against religions or a particular religion, or that it
was motivated by legitimate secular concerns."'6 "A regulation neutral
on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional
requirement for government neutrality if it unduly burdens the free
exercise of religion."l 65 After finding that the impact of the compulsory
attendance law was severe and undeniably at odds with the fundamental
tenets of Amish religious beliefs, the Court concluded that the Amish
were constitutionally entitled to an exemption from the law.166
In Yoder, the Court unqualifiedly stated that a neutral law of
general applicability may, as applied, violate the Free Exercise Clause. It
should be noted, however, that aside from Yoder and the unemployment
benefits cases, from 1960 through 1990 the Court has never upheld a free
exercise claim when the law at issue was one of general applicability.167
Reviewing the Court's record in free exercise cases during this period of
time, one commentator declaimed that the Sherbert free exercise doctrine
160. Id.
161. See Frazee v. Ill. Dept. of Income Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v.
Unemp't Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd.,
450 U.S. 707 (1981).
162. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 220.
165. Id
166. Id. at 218.
167. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at 1254.
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was "more talk than substance."' 68 Although perhaps a bit histrionic, that
statement nonetheless accurately reflected that the Supreme Court rarely
sided with free exercise claimants.169
Even though free exercise claimants rarely won before the
Supreme Court, there were those who argued that the Sherbert doctrine
went too far in upholding the right to free exercise of religion.o Critics
of Sherbert pointed out that in effect it granted an exemption for
religiously-motivated conduct from neutral laws that otherwise were
constitutionally valid.' 7 1 It was said that this "promotes its own form of
inequality: a constitutional preference for religious over non-religious
belief systems."l 72
Whatever the merits or demerits of Sherbert, free exercise
doctrine changed severely in 1990 when the Supreme Court decided
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith. 73 This
case arose in Oregon when two Native Americans were fired from their
jobs at a drug rehabilitation clinic for ingesting peyote, a hallucinogenic
substance, for sacramental purposes at a ceremony of the Native
American Church.174 After being denied unemployment compensation by
the Employment Division of the Oregon Department of Human
Resources, the Native Americans filed suit, claiming that the denial of
unemployment compensation violated their right to the free exercise of
religion.175 Eventually the case reached the Supreme Court, which ruled
against the claimants, holding that there was no violation of the Free
168. Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1109 (1990).
169. Id. at 1109-10.
170. William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled
Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 357 (1989-90).
171. Id. at 357-58.
172. William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism,
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 319 (1991).
173. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
174. Id. at 882-83.
175. See id. at 903 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) ("There is no
dispute that Oregon's criminal prohibition of peyote places a severe burden on the
ability of respondents to freely exercise their religion. Peyote is a sacrament of the
Native American Church and is regarded as vital to respondents' ability to practice
their religion.").
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Exercise Clause.176 In so ruling, the Court set forth a new test to govern
free exercise claims, according to which the Free Exercise Clause cannot
be used to challenge a neutral law of general applicability. Abandoning
the compelling state interest test of Sherbert,17 7 the Court held that the
Free Exercise Clause does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
comply with a "valid and neutral law of general applicability" on the
ground of religious belief.18 That is, religious beliefs do not excuse an
individual from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting
conduct that is within state authority to regulate.17 9
The Court distinguished Sherbert and the other unemployment
cases on the ground that the conduct at issue in those cases was not
prohibited by law, whereas the use of peyote was prohibited by Oregon
law.'so Building on that distinction, Justice Scalia's majority opinion
declared that "[w]e have never held that an individual's religious beliefs
excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting
conduct that the State is free to regulate."18 ' Thus, the Court ruled that
religious motivation for using peyote did not exempt individuals from a
neutral criminal law that was concededly constitutional as applied to
those who use peyote for other reasons.182
The Court took a different tack in distinguishing Yoder, asserting
that it involved not only a free exercise claim, but also another
constitutionally protected claim, namely, the right of parents to direct the
upbringing of their children.183 In contrast, Smith did not present "such a
hybrid situation," and therefore did not evoke the enhanced constitutional
176. See id. at 890 (majority opinion).
177. Id at 884 ("Even if we were inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life
beyond the unemployment compensation field, we would not apply it to require
exemptions from a generally applicable criminal law."). The Court abandoned the
compelling state interest test by a vote of 5-4. Id at 873. Justice O'Connor concurred
in the judgment on other grounds. Id. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan
and Marshall, dissented. Id
178. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)
(Stevens, J., concurring)).
179. Id. at 878-79.
180. Id at 876.
181. Id.at878-79.
182. Id at 878.
183. Id at 881.
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protection that was appropriate in Yoder.184 So, the Court concluded that
where a free exercise claim is unconnected to another constitutionally
protected right, such as the right of parents to direct the upbringing of
their children or the right to freedom of speech, a religious exemption
from a neutral law of general applicability will not be granted.
Critics of the Scalia opinion in Smith, including some who
agreed with the decision itself, were especially scornful of its treatment
of Yoder and the Sherbert line of cases. Michael McConnell found
Smith's use of precedent "troubling, bordering on the shocking." 86
Douglas Laycock declared that the Court's reading of precedent in Smith
was "transparently dishonest."187 And William Marshall described the
use of precedent in Smith as "border[ing] on fiction." 88
Moreover, as Justice Souter explained in a later case, the
"hybrid-rights" exception announced in Smith is ultimately untenable.189
"If a hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional right is
implicated, then the exception would" probably be so vast as to swallow
the Smith rule and certainly would encompass the activity in Smith itself,
"since free speech and associational rights were clearly implicated in the
peyote ritual."' 90 On the other hand, if a hybrid claim is one in which a
litigant would actually be exempt from a generally applicable law under
another constitutional provision, then there would be no reason in a
supposedly hybrid case to evoke the Free Exercise Clause at all.191
Commentators have been routinely disdainful of the hybrid-rights
exception, viewing it as a bungled attempt to distinguish disagreeable
precedent,192 and the Sixth Circuit refused to follow it on the ground that
it was "completely illogical." 93 Other circuits have similarly declined to
184. Id. at 882.
185. Id.
186. McConnell, supra note 168, at 1120.
187. Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1,
2-3 (1990).
188. Marshall, supra note 172, at 309.
189. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
567 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring).
190. Id.
19 1. Id.
192. See Lund, supra note 29, at 630 n. 19.
193. Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of Ohio State Univ. of Veterinary Med., 5 F.3d
177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993).
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follow the exception' 9 4 and even its progenitor, Justice Scalia, seems to
have abandoned it.195
Whatever the flaws of Justice Scalia's reasoning in Smith,
however, the Court's ruling that the Free Exercise Clause may not be
used to challenge a neutral law of general applicability prevailed as a
constitutional ruling that defines the extent of religious liberty.196 The
ruling in Smith significantly reduced the scope of constitutional
protection accorded to religious conduct. In Smith, the Court abandoned
the use of strict scrutiny to review the regulation of religious practices
under neutral laws of general applicability.197 This granted the
government considerably more leeway to regulate religious activities
than previously existed. Under the Smith calculus, as long as a law is
neutral toward religion, its application to religious conduct will be
accepted as constitutional with little or no justification for the law.
Although Smith maintains the use of strict scrutiny to review laws that
target religious practices, laws that are neutral toward religion are
allowed to fly under the constitutional radar, escaping any sort of
meaningful judicial review, even when applied to regulate religious
activity.
Justice O'Connor believed this was a serious mistake that
truncated the First Amendment. She asserted that the First Amendment
does not distinguish between laws that are generally applicable and those
that target particular religious practices. From her perspective, a
general law that "prohibits certain conduct-conduct that happens to be
an act of worship for someone-manifestly does prohibit that person's
free exercise of his religion" and therefore should be subject to strict
194. See Combs v. Homer-Center Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 24-47 (3rd Cir.
2008); Jacobs v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419, 440 n.45 (9th Cir. 2008).
195. See Lund, supra note 29, at 631-32.
196. State courts, though, are free to interpret their state constitutions
independently of federal constitutional doctrine, and a number of state courts, in
interpreting their own state constitutional religion clauses, have rejected Smith and
continued to follow the approach in Sherbert. See, e.g., Attorney General v. Desilets,
636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994); Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039 (Ohio 2000).
197. See supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
198. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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scrutiny.199 The majority's repudiation of strict scrutiny "has no basis in
precedent and relegates a serious First Amendment value to the barest
level of minimum scrutiny that the Equal Protection Clause already
,,200
provides. In Justice O'Connor's view, the Court's ruling was a
dramatic departure from settled First Amendment jurisprudence and was
incompatible with the nation's fundamental commitment to individual
201religious liberty.
In certain corners, Smith's revisionist jurisprudence was viewed
with apprehension, not to say alarm. There were those who described
Smith as a "sweeping disaster for religious liberty."202 One commentator
went so far as to suggest that if the Court intended to defer to any
formally neutral law restricting religion, it has created "a legal
framework for persecution." 20 3
At the opposite extreme, Smith had its defenders, who
maintained that, despite the sundry flaws of the Scalia opinion, the Court
had reached the right result.204 The defenders of Smith asserted that to
create exemptions from neutral laws for religious practices amounted to
government favoritism of religion that raised serious constitutional
concerns under both the Free Speech Clause and the Establishment
Clause.205
In 1993, Congress attempted to reverse the ruling in Smith by
enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the stated
purpose of which was to "restore the compelling interest test as set forth
199. Id at 893.
200. Id. at 894 (quoting Hobbie v. Unemp't Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S.
136, 141-42 (1987)); see also Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 727 (1986) (O'Connor,
J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the Court's ruling has "no
basis in precedent").
201. Smith, 494 U.S. at 891 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun
asserted that the Court's decision "effectuate[d] a wholesale overturning of settled
law concerning the Religion Clauses of our Constitution." Id. at 908 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
202. Edward M. Gaffney, Douglas Laycock & Michael W. McConnell, An
Open Letter to the Religious Community, FIRST THINGs 44, 44 (March 1991).
203. Laycock, supra note 187, at 4.
204. See generally Marshall, supra note 172, at 310 (defending "Smith's
rejection of the constitutionally compelled free exercise exemption").
205. Id. at 320; See also Mark Tushnet, Of Church and State and the Supreme
Court: Kurland Revisited, 1989 SUP. CT. REv. 373, 390 (1989).
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in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder and to guarantee its
application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially
burdened."206 RFRA expressly provided that "[g]overnment shall not
substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability" except where the
government can demonstrate that the burden is necessary to further a
207compelling state interest and is the least restrictive means of doing so.
RFRA, however, was short-lived: In City of Boerne v. Flores,208 the
Supreme Court, defending its prerogative to have the final say on the
meaning of the nation's highest law, ruled that the Act was beyond
209Congressional authority and therefore unconstitutional.
The ruling in Smith was not particularly well-received among
state courts, a number of which, in interpreting free exercise guarantees
in their own state constitutions, expressed disagreement with the decision
and declined to adopt it at the state level.210 The Supreme Court of
Minnesota flatly declared that it would not follow the "limited analysis"
in Smith and instead would continue to apply strict scrutiny to laws
206. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000bb(b)(1) (1993),
invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
207. 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-1(a), (b) (emphasis added).
208. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
209. Id. at 532-33, 536. Congressional authority to enact RFRA was based on
§5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Supreme Court ruled that in enacting
RFRA Congress had exceeded its authority under §5. Id. at 514, 536. The Court's
ruling, however, only pertains to state regulations of religious practices and not
federal ones. RFRA remains in effect with regard to federal regulations. See
Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
210. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039 (Ohio 2000); Swanner v.
Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994). A state court is free
to interpret its own state constitution independently of federal constitutional
doctrine. While decisions of the United States Supreme Court are entitled to respect,
they are not binding on a state court as it interprets its own state constitutional
provisions, even when state and federal provisions are similarly worded. As long as
state constitutional protection does not fall below the federal floor, a state court may
interpret it own state constitution as it chooses, irrespective of federal law. Clearly, a
state is free as a matter of its own law to grant more expansive rights than is afforded
by federal law. JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, EQUALITY AND LIBERTY IN THE GOLDEN AGE
OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 136 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
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211 -
challenged under the Minnesota free exercise clause. Similarly, the
New York Court of Appeals rejected what it described as "the inflexible
rule of Smith."2 12 In addition, several state legislatures enacted state
RFRAs mandating that the state may burden the free exercise of religion
"only if it demonstrates that the application of the burden is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." 2 13
In the federal realm, however, despite the criticism leveled
against it, the ruling in Smith remained firm. And in time, the criticism of
Smith diminished, if for no other reason than the decision was a fait
accompli that would not be reversed.2 14 At that point, the focus in free
exercise litigation became determining the boundaries of neutrality and
general applicability.215
Three years after Smith, the Court turned its attention to
delineating those boundaries in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah.21 There, in an opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the
Court struck down several ordinances prohibiting ritual sacrifice of
animals.217 In examining the ordinances, the Court treated neutrality and
general applicability as separate matters and found that the ordinances
were neither neutral nor of general applicability.218 Regarding neutrality,
the Court pointed to several aspects of the ordinances indicating that they
211. Hill-Murray Fed'n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487 N.W.2d
857, 865 (Minn. 1992).
212. Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459,
466 (N.Y. 2006).
213. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571b(b) (West 2005).
214. Lund, supra note 29, at 628.
215. See Duncan, supra note 6, at 859 ("Thus, the key issue in religious liberty
litigation has become locating the borders of neutrality and general applicability.");
Ira C. Lupu, The Case Against Legislative Codfication of Religious Liberty, 21
CARDOZO L. REV. 565, 572 (1999) ("The key to the Lukumi Babalu Aye line of cases
involves the scope of what constitutes general applicability. . .
216. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
217. Id at 524-25. Justice Kennedy wrote for a majority of the Court in most,
but not all, parts of the opinion. See id. at 523.
218. Id. at 533-46. In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia asserted that it was
unnecessary to treat neutrality and general applicability as separate matters and that
the Court should acknowledge that the terms substantially overlap. Id. at 557 (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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targeted religious conduct. First, the Court noted that the words
"sacrifice" and "ritual," used in the text of the ordinances, have a
religious origin but also admit of secular meaning.2 19 Although the use of
those words supported a claim of facial discrimination, it did not
conclusively demonstrate that claim.220 The Free Exercise Clause,
however, extends beyond facial discrimination to forbid "subtle
departures from neutrality" 22' and "covert suppression of particular
religious beliefs." 222 Government action that targets religious conduct for
differential treatment "cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the
requirement of facial neutrality." 22 3
In further assessing the ordinances, the Court described them as
a "religious gerrymander" drafted in tandem to target a particular
religion, the Santeria religion, which engages in animal sacrifice as a
- 224central element of worship. Indeed, virtually the only conduct subject
to the ordinances was the religious exercise of Santeria church
225
members. The ordinances excluded almost all killing of animals except
for religious sacrifice and further exempted the killing of animals, such
as kosher slaughtering, by other religions. 22 6 "The net result of the
gerrymander was that few if any killings of animals were prohibited
other than Santeria sacrifice," leading the Court to conclude that the
221Santeria religion was the exclusive target of the ordinances.
The ordinances were discriminatory in other aspects, as well.
While purporting to ban only the "unnecessary" killing of animals, the
ordinances allowed hunting, slaughtering of animals for food, eradication
of pests, and euthanasia on the ground they were "necessary." 2 28 Even
229
the use of live rabbits to train greyhounds for racing was permitted.
219. Id at 533-34 (majority opinion).
220. Id at 534.
221. Id. (quoting Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971)).
222. Id. (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703 (1986) (opinion of Burger,
C.J.)).
223. Id.
224. Id at 535 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'r of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664, 696
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
225. Id
226. Id. at 536.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 537.
229. Id.
2012] RULES OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY
Thus, the ordinances deemed religious reasons for killing animals less
important than nonreligious reasons, and thereby singled out religious
practice for discriminatory treatment.230
As revealed by the legislative record in the case, the
discriminatory effect of the ordinances was no accident.2 3 1 Members of
the city council and other city officials, as well as residents of the city,
exhibited profound hostility toward the Santeria religion and its practice
232
of animal sacrifice. At meetings of the city council, the Santeria
religion was described as "abhorrent," "an abomination to the Lord," and
"in violation of everything this country stands for." 2 33 The president of
the city council asked, "What can we do to prevent the Church from
opening?" 234 When a member of the city council stated that in
prerevolutionary Cuba people were put in jail for practicing the Santeria
religion, the audience applauded. Given this record, there was no
doubt that the ordinances were motivated by deep animosity toward the
Santeria religion.
Clearly, then, the ordinances were anything but neutral.
Motivated by religious hostility, targeted at a particular religious ritual,
and gerrymandered to proscribe religious but not secular killing of
animals, the ordinances were aimed at suppressing the Santeria
. . 236
religion.
Turning to the requirement of general applicability, the Court
found that the ordinances also fell short of that standard. This was
apparent through an examination of the two interests advanced by the
city in support of the ordinances, protecting the public health and
237
preventing cruelty to animals. The ordinances were underinclusive as a
means of achieving those ends, because they "fail[ed] to prohibit
nonreligious conduct that endanger[ed] [those] interests in a similar or
230. Id. at 537-38.
23 1. Id. at 540 (noting that the record showed that the ordinances were enacted
"because of, not merely in spite of' suppression of Santeria religious practices).
232. Id. at 541.
233. Id. at 541-42.
234. Id. at 541.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 542.
237. Id. at 543.
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greater degree than Santeria [animal] sacrifice [did]." 23 8 Despite the
city's claimed interest in preventing cruelty to animals, the ordinances
forbade few killings other than those for religious sacrifice. In fact, many
types of animal killing for nonreligious reasons were either not
231
prohibited or expressly allowed under the ordinances.
The Court also found that the ordinances were underinclusive in
regard to the city's interest in public health, which was "threatened by
the [unsanitary disposal] of animal carcasses and the consumption of
uninspected meat."240 Neither of those harms was addressed by
regulation except in connection with religiously-motivated conduct,
despite the fact that the health risks posed by improper disposal of animal
carcasses are the same whether preceded by religious sacrifice or non-
religious killing of animals.241 Neither hunters nor restaurants were
242
subject to the ordinances. Although unsanitary disposal is a general
problem that causes substantial health concerns, the ordinance only
addressed it when resulting from religious conduct.243
The ordinances further were underinclusive as a means of
244
deterring consumption of uninspected meat. The goal of preventing
consumption of uninspected meat was not addressed in situations similar
to religious animal sacrifice.245 Hunters were not prohibited from eating
246
their kill, nor fishermen from eating their catch. No law required the
inspection of meat from animals raised for the use of their owner,
247
household members, or guests and employees. One of the ordinances
even granted an exemption to any person, group, or organization that
slaughters or processes "small numbers" of hogs or cattle "for sale." 248
The ordinances, then, were substantially underinclusive, and as
such failed the requirement of general applicability. Motivated by
238. Id
239. Id at 543-44.
240. Id. at 544.
241. Id. at 545.
242. Id. at 544-45.
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animosity and selectively targeting a disfavored religion, the ordinances
were afflicted by the "precise evil" that the requirement of general
249
applicability was designed to prevent.
After concluding that the ordinances were neither neutral nor
generally applicable, the Court went on to apply strict scrutiny to them.
As the Court said, a law burdening religious practice that is neither
neutral nor generally applicable must undergo "the most rigorous of
,250
scrutiny.' This means that the law under question "must advance
interests of 'the highest order' and must be 'narrowly tailored in pursuit
of those interests."' 25 1 As might be expected, the city ordinances
challenged in Lukumi could not pass that test. Clearly, the ordinances
were not drawn in narrow terms to effectuate their purported objectives
252
of protecting the public health and preventing cruelty to animals. To
the contrary, all of the ordinances were either severely overbroad or
underinclusive.253 Their claimed objectives were not pursued in regard to
similar non-religious conduct, thus rendering the ordinances
254
underinclusive to a substantial degree. Given those circumstances, the
ordinances could not be regarded as protecting a compelling state
interest, and the Court therefore invalidated the ordinances on the ground
25
that they violated the Free Exercise Clause.
There are several important lessons to be taken from Lukumi.
One is that a close affinity exists between the requirement of general
applicability and the requirement of equal protection. In discussing the
principle of general applicability, the Court explicitly stated in Lukumi
that "[t]he Free Exercise Clause protects religious observers against
unequal treatment."256 Moreover, Justice Kennedy's opinion pointedly
noted that in free exercise cases to determine if the object of a law is
257
neutral, guidance can be found in equal protection cases. In fact,
249. Id. at 545-46.
250. Id at 546.
251. Id (citing McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1978)).
252. Id
253. Id
254. Id. at 546-47.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 542 (citing Hobbie v. Unemp't Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S.
136, 148 (1987)).
257. Id. at 540.
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"[n]eutrality in its application requires an equal protection mode of
analysis." 25 8
Throughout the Court's opinion in Lukumi several equal
protection concepts played a prominent role. The Court stressed that the
ordinances were improperly selective and underinclusive.259 Religious
conduct was singled out for discriminatory treatment that was motivated
by ill will and animosity.260 In sum, there was a denial of equal
protection of the law and therefore the law was neither generally
applicable nor neutral.
Another significant lesson to be taken from Lukumi is that
neutrality is not to be determined simply from the text of a law. "Facial
neutrality is not determinative . . . . Apart from the text, the effect of a
law in its real operation is strong evidence of its object."2 6 1 In finding
that the ordinances were not neutral, Justice Kennedy's opinion in
Lukumi underscored the discriminatory impact of the ordinances, which
belied their benign appearance.262 Justice Kennedy's analysis, directed to
assessing the effect of the ordinances in the real world, reaffirmed that
impermissible discrimination may occur through disparate impact, as
well as through statutory directives overtly designed to discriminate.
Moreover, legislative motive also is relevant to the determination
of neutrality. Justice Kennedy's opinion 26 explained that relevant
evidence of non-neutrality includes, among other things, the historical
background of the law in question, the specific series of events leading to
enactment of the law, and contemporaneous statements made by
264members of the body that enacted the law -all of which are matters
that go to legislative motive. And, of course, the Kennedy opinion relied
upon the presence of hostile legislative motive in concluding that the
265ordinances were not neutral.
258. Id. (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'r of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
259. See supra notes 237-49 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
261. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534-35 (emphasis added).
262. Id. at 541-42.
263. This part of Justice Kennedy's opinion was joined only by Justice
Stevens. Id. at 522, 540-42.
264. Id. at 540.
265. Id.
452 [Vol. 10
20121 RULES OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY
Although Justice Scalia joined the lion's share of the Kennedy
opinion, he entered a separate concurring opinion taking issue with
Justice Kennedy's position in regard to the use of motive to show non-
neutrality.266 Justice Scalia objected to the use of legislative motive
because he believes that it is "virtually impossible to determine the
singular 'motive' of a collective legislative body."267 In spite of Justice
Scalia's claim that the Court has a long tradition of refraining from
268.-
inquiries concerning legislative motive, it is a tradition that the Court
has honored more in its breach than its observance.269 In fact, there are a
number of areas in which the Court regularly assesses legislative motive
in reviewing the constitutionality of laws. 2 70 As for legislative motive
being difficult or impossible to determine, that is not invariably so. To
the contrary, by the Court's own admission, there are times when the
dominant motive of the legislature can be determined with a good deal of
271
certainty from the legislative record. In Lukumi, the dominant
legislative motive-suppression of the Santeria religion-comes across
272
loud and clear. Even if legislative motive may be difficult to determine
in some cases, there is no reason to preclude its examination in cases
such as Lukumi where that difficulty simply does not exist.
Justice Souter entered a concurring opinion in Lukumi, offering a
273
further refinement on the matter of neutrality. Justice Souter believes
that it is important to distinguish between a requirement of formal
neutrality, which bars deliberate discrimination, and a requirement of
substantial neutrality, which requires the government to justify any
serious burden on religiously motivated conduct by a compelling state
274
interest and by means narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. As
266. Id. at 557 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Justice Scalia's opinion Was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist. Id
267. Id. at 558. Justice Scalia previously made a similar argument in Edwards
v. Aguillar, 482 U.S. 578, 636-39 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
268. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 558 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
269. See SHAMAN, supra note 31, at 166 (2001).
270. Id. at 155-64.
271. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1985).
272. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 528-29.
273. Id. at 559-77 (Souter, J., concurring in part).
274. Id. at 561-63. Justice Souter also differentiates between formal neutrality
and facial neutrality:
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Justice Souter reads it, the Scalia opinion in Smith plainly assumed that
275the Free Exercise Clause required nothing more than formal equality.
As a result, in Smith the Court adopted what Justice Souter described as a
"narrow conception of free-exercise neutrality" that should be re-
276examined in an appropriate case. Lukumi, however, was not that case,
because the ordinances in question there were not neutral under any
definition of neutrality.277 And since Lukumi, the Court has not shown
any inclination to reexamine its ruling in Smith.
. The Court barely mentioned Smith in Locke v. Davey,278 which
involved a State of Washington scholarship program that excluded
students pursuing a degree in devotional theology. 279 A student who
wished to use a scholarship to train for the ministry challenged the
280exclusion on the ground that it violated the Free Exercise Clause. In an
opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court ruled that the
exclusion of devotional studies from the scholarship program did not
281violate the Free Exercise Clause. Noting that the case involved the
tension that frequently exists between the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses, the Court made it clear at the outset that the
Federal Constitution did not preclude Washington from allowing the
282scholarships to be used to study for the ministry, if it chose to do so.
The Supreme Court of Washington, however, had interpreted its own
constitution as barring even indirect funding of religious instruction in
While facial neutrality would permit discovery of a law's
object or purpose only by analysis of the law's words,
structure, and operation, formal neutrality would permit
enquiry also into the intentions of those who enacted the law
. .. . For present purposes, the distinction between formal and
facial neutrality is less important than the distinction between
those conceptions of neutrality and substantive neutrality.
Id. at 562 n.3.
275. Id. at 562.
276. Id. at 560.
277. Id. at 563.
278. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
279. Id.
280. Id. at 715-19.
281. Id. at 715.
282. Id. at 718-19.
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preparation for the ministry.28 The student who challenged the program
contended that under Lukumi the program was presumptively
unconstitutional because it was not facially neutral in regard to
284religion. The Court rejected that argument, stating that to do otherwise
285
would extend Lukumi well beyond both its facts and reasoning. In an
attempt to distinguish Lukumi, Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that in
Locke "the State's disfavor of religion (if it can be called that) is of a far
milder kind" that imposed neither criminal nor civil sanction on a
religious activity. This purported distinction is not especially
convincing. That the State's disfavor of religion in Locke is milder than it
was in Lukumi hardly makes it neutral; whether subject to a harsh or mild
sanction, discrimination is nonetheless discrimination.
Chief Justice Rehnquist also maintained in Locke that the State
"does not require students to choose between their religious beliefs and
receiving a government benefit . . . . The State has merely chosen not to
fund a distinct category of instruction." 28 7 This, too, is a flawed
argument, one of those false dichotomies to which Chief Justice
288Rehnquist often fell prey. That the State has chosen to fund a distinct
category of instruction does not preclude the possibility that the State
also has required students to choose between their religious beliefs and
receiving a government benefit. To the contrary, in choosing to fund a
certain category of instruction the State has in fact required students to
choose between their religious beliefs and receiving a grant.
Chief Justice Rehnquist further professed that the Washington
scholarship program did not evince the hostility toward religion that was
manifest in Lukumi.289 In his view, the program went "a long way toward
including religion in its benefits," by permitting students to attend
pervasively religious schools and to take devotional theology courses so
283. Id. at 719.
284. Id. at 720. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia argued that the program
was facially discriminatory toward religion because it withheld a benefit from some
individuals solely on the basis of religion. Id. at 726-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 720 (majority opinion).
286. Id.
287. Id. at 720-21.
288. See SHAMAN, supra note 31, at 43-44.
289. Locke, 540 U.S. at 724.
455
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIEW
long as they were not studying for the ministry. 2 90 While it is correct that
the Washington program in Locke did not embody the sort of hostility to
religion that abounded in Lukumi, whether this was sufficient to
291
distinguish the two cases is debatable.
The true basis for distinguishing the cases, however, lies not in
their comparative neutrality, but rather in the justification offered for the
laws in question in each case. As the Court amply demonstrated in
Lukumi, the ordinances there were not rationally related to any
292
compelling state interest. On the other hand, in Locke the exclusion of
scholarships to train for the ministry was adopted in order to avoid the
use of taxpayer funds to subsidize religious institutions, as required by
293
the Establishment Clause of the Washington Constitution. As Justice
Rehnquist noted, many state constitutions prohibit the use of tax moneys
294
to fund religious activities. On the federal level, adherence to these
state proscriptions makes for an appropriate accommodation of the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses.
Whatever the flaws of the Rehnquist opinion in Locke, the Court
seemed to reach the right result. As Erwin Chemerinsky has said, a
converse ruling would have "dramatically changed the law and meant
that any time a state provides assistance to secular entities it would be
required to give the same aid to religious institutions."295 Surely a better
result, and one that accommodates both Free Exercise and Establishment
Clause concerns, is to allow states discretion to fund religious activities
along with secular ones if they so choose, but not compel them to do so if
they choose otherwise. This, after all, is consistent with the principle that
"there are some state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but
not required by the Free Exercise Clause."2 96
290. Id. at 724-25.
291. Justice Scalia thought it was not sufficient to distinguish the cases. See id.
at 732-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
292. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
535 (1993).
293. Locke, 540 U.S. at 721-23.
294. Id. at 722-23.
295. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at 1263.
296. Locke, 540 U.S. at 719.
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Justice Scalia dissented in Locke, taking a strange position in
regard to neutrality.297 While insisting that the Washington program
violated the Free Exercise Clause because it facially discriminated
against religion, he allowed that this constitutional infirmity could be
298
remedied by eliminating the facial aspect of the discrimination. Justice
Scalia asserted that this could be done in any number of ways, such as
making the scholarships redeemable only at public universities or only
for select courses of study. 299 "Either option would replace a program
that facially discriminates against religion with one that just happens not
to subsidize it." 3  In other words, although Justice Scalia is adamantly
opposed to facial discrimination, he finds no fault with discriminatory
impact. This, of course, is the other side of the coin to his position in
Smith; so long as a rule is generally applicable on its face, its disparate
impact is of no concern. 30 ' This position seems to invite subterfuge; by
cleansing the face of discrimination, its insidious effect in the real world
is allowed to persist.
CONCLUSION
Laws of general applicability are neutral on their faces in regard
to religion and speech, but may have a restrictive effect that impinges
upon First Amendment religious or expressive activities. Nonetheless,
the Supreme Court has taken the position in some cases that, even when
they restrict religion or speech, rules of general applicability do not
implicate First Amendment concerns. In Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., the
Court ruled that the Free Speech Clause was not violated by a rule of
general applicability even where it had a restrictive effect upon
302
expressive activity. And in Employment Division v. Smith, the Court
ruled that the Free Exercise Clause was not violated by a neutral law of
general applicability, even where it had a restrictive effect upon religious
297. Id. at 725-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
298. Id. at 729.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. At another point in his opinion, Justice Scalia, citing Smith, declared that
the Court is no longer "in the business of reviewing facially neutral laws that merely
happen to burden some individual's religious exercise." Id. at 731.
302. See supra notes 86-101 and accompanying text.
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activity.3 03 These rulings had the effect of nullifying the constitutional
status of religious and expressive activities when regulated under a
general law and thereby removing them from the scope of protection
afforded by the First Amendment. Arcara, however, seems to be an
isolated decision that the Court has ignored in subsequent decisions
involving freedom of speech. In contrast, Smith established a relatively
firm precedent for free exercise of religion cases that effectuated a major
doctrinal revision to the Free Exercise Clause.30 5
In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the
Court formulated an important boundary to the ruling in Smith, namely
that the neutrality of a law is not to be determined simply from its text.306
Aside from its text, the effect of a law in its actual operation may be
cogent evidence that the law is aimed at religious activities. 307 The
discriminatory impact of a law may disprove its benign appearance.
Moreover, legislative motive may also be relevant to the determination
of neutrality. 308 The legislative motivation underlying a law, as well as its
impact in the real world, must be assiduously examined to determine if
the law is, in fact, neutral. A law that is neutral on its face, but is shown
by its impact or underlying motivation to be aimed at religion will not be
exempt from oversight under the First Amendment.
Still, there are laws that are genuinely neutral, designed to
further valid secular ends. Under the approach taken in Smith, truly
neutral rules of general applicability, even when used to regulate
religious or expressive activities are removed from First Amendment
oversight and, as a result, are subject to no more than minimal judicial
scrutiny under either the Due Process Clause or Equal Protection Clause.
This relegates First Amendment values to the barest level of
309
constitutional protection. Minimal scrutiny is the least demanding of
the three tiers of scrutiny-strict, intermediate, and minimal-formulated
303. See supra notes 173-85 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 127-38 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 196-209 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 220-23, 260-65 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 223-30 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 231-36 and accompanying text.
309. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 141-
42 (1987) (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 727 (1986) (O'Connor, J.
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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by the Supreme Court. In fact, minimal scrutiny (also referred to as
"rationality review") usually operates as virtually no scrutiny at all.310
When utilizing minimal scrutiny, the Supreme Court purports to require
that legislation be rationally related to a legitimate state interest, but in
most instances the Court blindly accepts the legislative judgment under
review with no genuine examination." In the vast majority of cases,
minimal scrutiny functions as a rubber stamp for legislation, providing
little more than a pretense of rationality.312
In Smith, in withdrawing First Amendment protection from the
plaintiffs claim, the Court explicitly refused to follow the ruling in
previous cases that strict scrutiny should be used to review free exercise
claims.3 13 Justice Scalia, who wrote the majority opinion in Smith, was
averse to the use of strict scrutiny, fearful that many rules of general
applicability that affect religious practices would be unable to meet the
high standard that it sets. 3 14
In response, it should be pointed out that strict scrutiny, though
rigorous, is not an impossible hurdle to overcome. In fact, laws
specifically directed at religious or expressive activities that are subject
to strict scrutiny do not invariably fail to pass constitutional muster. A
number of laws regulating religion or speech reviewed under strict
scrutiny have been found to be constitutionally justified by being
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. For example, in
a free speech case, Burson v. Freeman,315 the Court used strict scrutiny in
upholding a state law that prohibited the solicitation of votes or the
display or campaign materials within 100 feet of the entrance of a polling
place. The Court concluded that the law was constitutionally justified
310. SHAMAN, supra note 210, at 9.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. "Even if we were inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the
unemployment compensation field, we would not apply it to require exemptions
from a generally applicable criminal law." Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884
(1990).
314. Id. at 888.
315. 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
316. Id. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding under strict
scrutiny a law imposing various ceilings on campaign contributions made to
candidates for federal office on the ground that it served the compelling state interest
of prohibiting the actuality and appearance of corruption).
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because it served the compelling state interest of preventing voter
intimidation and election fraud.31 In a more recent case, discussed
above,318 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Court employed strict
scrutiny in sustaining a federal statute making it a crime to give advice to
foreign terrorist organizations.319 The Court found that the statute, even
as applied to expressive conduct concerning lawful, nonviolent activities,
was constitutionally justified by the compelling state interest in
protecting national security from the threats posed by foreign terrorist
.320
organizations.
In religion cases, also, strict scrutiny is not invariably
insurmountable. For instance, in United States v. Lee, 321 a case decided
prior to Smith when generally applicable rules that burdened religious
practices were still subject to strict scrutiny, the Court upheld a federal
law requiring the payment of Social Security taxes that was challenged
by an Amish individual on the ground that the law violated his First
Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. 322 Although the Court
acknowledged that the payment or receipt of taxes was forbidden by the
Amish faith, the Court nonetheless found that the tax law was justified,
even as applied to the Amish, because the law was essential to
accomplish the overriding governmental interest of providing a
323comprehensive insurance system for all Americans. In Smith itself,
Justice O'Connor entered a concurring opinion maintaining that the
prohibition of peyote, even when used for sacramental purposes, was
constitutionally justified because it was narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling state interest in enforcing laws that control the possession
and use of harmful drugs.324 In Justice O'Connor's view, although there
was no question that the prohibition of peyote placed a severe burden on
the plaintiffs' ability to freely exercise their religion, the state had an
overriding interest in preventing drug abuse, "one of the greatest
317. Burson, 504 U.S. at 211.
318. See supra notes 144-57 and accompanying text.
319. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, _ U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 2718-19.
320. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 2731.
321. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
322. Id.
323. Id. at 256-59.
324. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 904 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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problems affecting the health and welfare of our population."325 Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Smith as well as the opinions of the Court in
Burson, Holder, and Lee illustrate that strict scrutiny is not as
insurmountable as Justice Scalia believes it to be.
Moreover, a more lenient, though still meaningful standard of
review, intermediate scrutiny, is also available in cases involving
religious or expressive activities. Whereas strict scrutiny requires the
showing of a compelling state interest to sustain a law, intermediate
scrutiny prescribes a less demanding standard that calls for the showing
of an important or substantial state interest to sustain a law.326 And while
strict scrutiny requires that legislative means be absolutely necessary to
accomplish their ends, intermediate scrutiny expects that legislative
means be carefully tailored, though not absolutely necessary, to
accomplish their ends.32 In practice, intermediate scrutiny has proven to
be less severe than strict scrutiny and in numerous cases when using
intermediate scrutiny the Court has upheld laws challenged on First
328Amendment grounds.
Intermediate scrutiny would seem to be an appropriate standard
of review to assess rules of general applicability that have a restrictive
effect upon religious activities. While rules of general applicability have
325. Id. (quoting Treasury Emps. v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989)). But
see id. at 909-21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that under strict scrutiny the
state's interest in enforcing its drug laws against the religious use of peyote was not
sufficiently compelling to outweigh the individuals' right to the free exercise of their
religion).
326. SHAMAN, supra note 210, at 10.
327. Id.
328. See Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (upholding under
intermediate scrutiny a law requiring disclosure of the names and addresses of
persons who sign referendum ballot petitions on the ground that the law preserved
the integrity of the electoral process by preventing fraud, detecting invalid
signatures, and fostering government transparency and accountability); Fla. Bar v.
Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (upholding under intermediate scrutiny a
regulation prohibiting personal injury lawyers from sending targeted direct-mail
solicitations to victims and their relatives for 30 days following an accident on the
ground that the regulation served to protect the privacy and tranquility of accident
victims from invasive conduct by lawyers); Members of City Council v. Taxpayers
for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (upholding under intermediate scrutiny a municipal
law prohibiting the posting of signs on public property on the ground that the law
prevented "visual clutter").
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valid secular ends and therefore are less constitutionally suspect than
laws specifically aimed at religion, if their effect is to restrict religious
activities, they should not be entirely exempt from meaningful review.
Intermediate scrutiny offers a happy medium for reviewing laws where
neither strict nor minimal scrutiny is warranted.
In fact, intermediate scrutiny was originally devised in a First
Amendment case involving a neutral law of general applicability. The
case was United States v. O'Brien, in which an individual was convicted
of burning his draft card in violation of a federal statute prohibiting the
mutilation or destruction of a draft card. 329 As described by the Court,
the statute was directed on its face to conduct having no connection with
speech and therefore plainly did not abridge free speech on its face.330 In
fact, the Court stated that "[a] law prohibiting destruction of Selective
Service certificates no more abridges free speech on its face than a motor
vehicle law prohibiting the destruction of drivers' licenses, or a tax law
prohibiting the destruction of books and records." 33 1 In other words, the
statute was a law of general applicability neutral in regard to speech. Be
that as it may, Mr. O'Brien, who had burned his draft card as an act of
symbolic expression to protest the war in Vietnam, argued that the statute
was unconstitutional as applied to him because it penalized his First
Amendment right to freedom of speech.332
The case, then, presented a dilemma of what level of scrutiny the
Court should use to resolve the issue at hand. At the time of the case,
only two levels of scrutiny, minimal and strict, had been formulated.333
The conduct in question in the case-burning a draft card-had elements
of both speech and action. On one hand it expressed an idea-in fact, a
political idea-that, if presented in a more pure form of speech such as
the printed page or the spoken word, would be entitled to the protection
of strict scrutiny under the First Amendment. On the other hand, O'Brien
had engaged in action-burning a draft card-that ordinarily would
evoke only minimal constitutional protection. Why not compromise,
then, and follow a middle course, a level of scrutiny intermediate to strict
329. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
330. Id. at 375.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 376.
333. SHAMAN, supra note 31, at 93.
462 [Vol. 10
2012] RULES OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY
and minimal? And that is exactly what the Court did in O'Brien by
articulating what was then a new constitutional standard of review that
required the government to show an "important or substantial"
governmental interest in justification of the law in question, that is, a
higher standard than the mere rationality of minimal scrutiny but lower
than the compelling state interest of strict scrutiny. 334 Thus, in O'Brien
the Court charted an intermediate course of constitutional review.
In O'Brien, the Court created an intermediate level of scrutiny as
a compromise to resolve the dilemma of what level of scrutiny to use in
cases involving conduct that combines elements of speech and action.
But O'Brien also can be seen as a case adopting an intermediate level of
scrutiny to deal with constitutional challenges to laws of general
applicability that have a restrictive effect on freedom of speech. The
Court emphasized in O'Brien that the statute in question was not on its
face directed to expressive activities; i.e., it was a neutral law of general
applicability.335 But the Court did not think minimal scrutiny was the
appropriate standard to utilize in the case, precisely because, as applied,
336
the statute had a restrictive impact upon freedom of expression.
The intermediate course chartered in O'Brien seems to provide a
particularly suitable means for assessing rules of general applicability
that restrict religious activities. Because they are not specifically aimed
at religious activities, rules of general applicability may not be
considered presumptively unconstitutional, as is the practice under strict
scrutiny. Still, when employed to regulate religious activities, rules of
general applicability should not enjoy the extreme tolerance allowed
under minimal scrutiny, which in practice operates as virtually no
scrutiny at all. Intermediate scrutiny, then, seems to be an appropriate
compromise by which to evaluate rules of general applicability that are
brought to bear on religious activities.
The notion that rules of general applicability should escape
meaningful judicial review even when they infringe religious or
expressive activities is a dubious proposition that runs counter to the
understanding that a law that is constitutional on its face may be
unconstitutional as applied in a particular situation. Smith and Arcara are
334. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
335. Id. at 381-82.
336. Id. at 376-77.
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problematic decisions that retract the scope of First Amendment
protection afforded to religious and expressive activities and give
constitutional immunity to general laws that restrict the free exercise of
religion and freedom of speech. To say, as some justices have, that the
First Amendment is not implicated by a general law that "just happens"
to restrict speech or religion337 or that imposes an "incidental" burden on
speech or religion338 is a dismissive attitude that disregards the reality
that general laws may place severe burdens on First Amendment
activities. In most circumstances, the Supreme Court has recognized that,
although a law appears innocent on its face, it may have harmful effects
in the real world that raise serious constitutional concerns. Rules of
general applicability, clothed in neutrality, may appear to be innocent,
but appearances, after all, can be deceiving.
337. See Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 707 (1986); Locke v.
Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 729 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
338. See Arcara, 478 U.S. at 705; Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560,
576 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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